

'on the lines').

- 16 Your teacher teaches you how to answer textually implicit questions (whose answers can be located between the lines).
- 17 Your teacher teaches you how to answer scriptally implicit questions (whose answers can only be generated beyond the lines).

****Thank you for your cooperation****

Appendix-B

CRITICAL READING TEST

Name----- Class and semester-----

Read the following passage and answer the questions given at the end:

1. All down the ages, many people have believed that Nature holds mysterious and mighty secrets. In the past they thought that if they could learn these secrets, they would gain all sorts of powers, either to benefit themselves, or to direct the lives of other people, for good or evil purposes. There has been a long history, then, of those who have claimed access to the mysteries of Nature. Magicians and witches, fortune-tellers and astrologers boasted that they could see a deeper meaning in the way the world operated. They said that the appearance of strange stars in the sky, the violent forces of earthquakes and storms and the mysterious onset of plagues could all be attributed to the workings of Nature. They claimed that only they could understand them.
2. No doubt man's first acquaintance with these mysteries was through the animals around him. Curious hoof marks sometimes be seen in the lonely woodlands were thought to be belonging to some horrifying spirits. So, people began to make humble offerings of food and wine to animals in order to pacify these spirits. And what of those roarings and rumblings underground that often went before some violent earthquake. Was it some bull-like creature beneath the earth roaring and running wild? Let the powerful bulls above have special place, then, among the herds of animals, and let them be worshiped in ceremony and rituals. This is how the animals took the roles of gods in men's eyes and that ritual worship quickly developed. The animal-rituals were mostly violent to echo the violence that the gods could display. The animal worshippers dressed themselves in animal skins, hoping to assume some of the wild attributes of their gods. Many living creatures, even humans were torn apart at the climax of such rituals.

3. Moon-worshippers, however, tended to follow the gentler paths of worship. The learning of spells and magic formulae formed the core of their devotion, for they believed that the mysterious powers of nature could in this way be brought under some control, or at least persuaded to act in their favour. Women also played their part in worshipping moon-goddess by reciting spells and magic formulae. These, they believed, could bring rich harvest, divert storms and floods, and control the powers of wild, dangerous animals.
4. Later, the new religions emerged which sought to root out the ancient worship of Nature and its supernatural spirits. The female magicians were classed as 'witches', and to call a woman a witch was automatically to accuse her of sinful practices. They were suspected of bringing bad-health and harm to innocent people by calling devil-spirits through their magic spells. Therefore, the new religions started persecuting them.
5. In time, science began to provide psychological explanations for types of human behavior which had formerly been regarded as deeply suspicious. It also began to present geographical reasons for the rendings of earth, the violence of winds and the fury of waters. Witches, if they did exist, could be regarded as harmless cranks, and there was no longer any need for sorcerers or magicians in the age of science. Yet man still looks in wonder at the mighty forces of Nature; violent storms, floods and earthquakes make headline news across the world and somehow the plain scientific facts that lie behind them do not dispel our fear and awe of Nature's powers. The stars at night are not just part of some unending world outside; they can control and direct our lives, according to astrologers. Man, it seems, will always be fascinated by things supernatural, and will not give up his quest to find out more about the many mysteries that science cannot explain.

QUESTIONS

SECTION 1: SPECIFIC PARAGRAPHS

From paragraph 1:

1. What powers people in the past sought to gain by learning the secrets of nature?

From paragraph 2:

2. Strange hoof prints could sometimes be seen in the woodlands. What did people think about them?

3. Explain in your own words why, according to the passage, some primitive worshippers were dressed in animal skins?

From paragraph 3:

4. Explain in your own words the purpose of the spells and magic formulae in moon-worship.

From paragraph 4:

5. What was suspected about the female worshippers or magicians?

From paragraph 5:

6. Explain the two ways in which science has attempted to remove superstitious beliefs from men's minds.

In paragraph 5, what do these phrases refer to? i) The rending of earth, ii) the violence of winds, and iii) the fury of waters. Find answer in the same paragraph ahead.

SECTION 2: OVERALL COMPREHENSION

7. In the passage, the author has compared two styles of worship. Name them.

8. What conclusion does the author give to his argument on the mysteries of nature and the logics of science? Which one is more powerful according to him? State in your own words.

9. Has the author been logical in presenting the details of his argument? Yes or no? Support your stance.

10. "Man, it seems, will always be fascinated by things supernatural, and will not give up his quest to find out more about the many mysteries that science

cannot explain”, says the author. Do you agree?

Having read the whole passage, what interpretation do you personally give to the natural disasters (i.e. floods and earthquakes) occurring in your own country? Scientific changes, religious aspects or the supernatural element? Argue.

11. Suggest a suitable title for the above passage.

12. Summarize the passage in your own words. OR Make an outline.

DE-RADICALIZATION AFTER OPERATION RAH-E- RAST

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Abstract

Radicalization is the biggest problem of Pakistani society. Countering terrorism wants a multi-faceted method which includes not only threatening it through the armed forces of the country but also through disengagement policies. This article explains different approaches and strategies of de-radicalization, disengagement and rehabilitation of the detainees. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sri-Lanka, Colombia, Singapore and Indonesia all have used de-radicalization programs and success level is satisfactory. De-radicalization method is logically twofold: first, jails provide an atmosphere where the prisoners have time to think and cooperate with much guidance and supervision; and second, the detainees should be involved in practical and positive actions, without which they would likely practice their phase in prison to stimulate outside support and radicalize further detainees. Analysis of the phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistan in the backdrop of contemporary strategies suggests a viable national approach to counter radicalization. Rehabilitation of arrested militants and fighters becomes an essential part of any such program as part of the deterrence policy.

Key Words: Radicalization, de-radicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, detainees

Introduction

Since September 11, 2001, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have taken up sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal areas that border Afghanistan, and addressing this sanctuary may be the most essential step to defeating them. So far, Islamabad has failed to deny safe haven to militant groups in this region. Two major factors dictate whether Pakistan will eliminate this sanctuary. The first is Islamabad's willingness to combat these insurgent and terrorist groups, and the second is its ability to do so. Examining Pakistan's willingness to fight militant groups is moot, however, if Pakistan is unable to wage counterinsurgency successfully. Therefore, the second major factor is Pakistan's capacity for conducting a counterinsurgency campaign. This research seeks to examine the extent to which Pakistan is actually engaging in best counterinsurgency practices and to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses in doing so. Through a case study of the summer 2009 Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat District and an examination of Pakistani learning since then, this analyzes Pakistan's effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations and

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suggests policies to improve its capabilities in future (Cohen & Nawaz, 2009, p. 5).

Summer 2009 military operations in Swat District present an excellent case study to examine Pakistan's ability to wage counterinsurgency because Islamabad's willingness in this instance is not in question. Unlike other operations in KPK and FATA, Pakistan was motivated to defeat the militant group and retake and hold the territory in the long term. Regaining control of Swat District was of strategic importance to Pakistan because the idea of losing it was unacceptable. Swat is a vacation destination characterized by wealthy land owners in KPK rather than in FATA. It is a largely settled area, much closer to Islamabad and Punjab than Waziristan. Therefore, it enjoys greater strategic importance for Pakistani state (NC Report, 12 March 2010, p. 1). Academics argue that rather than protecting the local population, Pakistan's preferred practice is to capture and kill the enemy with little regard to the destruction that results. Rashid argues that Pakistan's heavy-handed tactics have been largely ineffective, as the military's methods are the complete opposite of the best practices prescribed by counterinsurgency literature and doctrine (Rashid, 2009, p. 8).

Galula lays out an eight-step operational plan for waging a successful counterinsurgency. He further claims that if a counterinsurgent is successful in each step, he will be successful overall: "The expected result – final defeat of the insurgents – is not an addition but a multiplication of these various operations; they are all essential and if one is nil, the product will be zero" (2006). The steps include: 1) destruction or expulsion of the insurgent forces; 2) deployment of the static unit; 3) contact with and control of the local population; 4) destruction of the insurgent political organization; 5) local elections; 6) testing of the leaders; 7) organizing a party; and 8) winning over or suppressing the last guerillas. These steps are fluid and can, to some extent, occur simultaneously. The cumulative success or failure in each of these steps determines the extent to which the insurgency in FATA and KPK is still ongoing, and the militants in Swat District fall under the umbrella TTP organization. Since Swat is not insulated from the wider insurgency, it would be impossible for Islamabad to have won over or suppressed the last guerillas. Therefore, it would be unfair to evaluate

Pakistan's ultimate performance in Swat based on this step in which the counterinsurgent is successful (Galula, 2006, pp. 61-94).

De-radicalization is a small approach in Friedrich Schumacher's view that will provide big paybacks. In the same way, this belief is practical and valid when the strategic and security policy is planned. By using the policy of military operations, drone strikes and heavy technology the law and order situation of Pakistan has worsened and the small phase of rehabilitating of these militants has been very affective because it improves the radical-ideological context of the individual. When he participates back into the community, he can be productive for the community and can also teach the other individuals of the society. Radicalization is the main problem of Pakistani society today. The word radicalization is normally used to define the process whereby persons transform their thoughts over time from a series that community tends to reflect to be normal into a choice that community tends to deliberate to be extreme (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008, p. 2).

Model for Prisons

Prisons can also play a helpful part in confronting problems of terrorism and radicalization in society. According to international recommendations and resolutions, detainees have equal right to education as others. The facility of education and training chances in jails grants an opportunity to allow detainees to bridge the gaps in their knowledge and thus to support their alteration for the society. According to UN reports, all hostages shall have the chance to take part in education and cultural activities meant for the full improvement of the human behaviour. The imprisonment centre can perform a vital role in rehabilitation. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Singapore and Indonesia have all applied ideological-based de-radicalization structures that attempt at the modification of the beliefs held by these terrorists.

In Pakistan this activity is taken by the army and it is significant that the government must show determination in defining policy toward radicalism and extremism and controlling FATA and disturbed areas of KPK. In Pakistan there is no rule that satisfies the requirement of the rehabilitation of extremists and the lack of a legal framework for reintegration and rehabilitation has left Pakistan handicapped in confronting de-radicalization. The delivery of inclusive legal framework

for this determination will make de-radicalization more affective (Pervaiz, 2011, p. 131).

Pakistan Military launched a program for rehabilitation of captives in the Swat area of KPK in 2009 after an effective military operation against radical extremists there. In the operation, hundreds of extremists and their energetic followers were detained and are still in the military's supervision. In 2010, the military decided to monitor hostages in order to classify hard-core fighters. A de-radicalization procedure was started for the prisoners other than the diehard radicals. The initiative is still in its early stage and there is space to learn and create modifications where required to expand its risks of achievement (Rana, 2011, p. 1).

Rehabilitation programs for prisoners are generally a portion of a greater de-radicalization policy. Different countries use different methods but there are four main approaches in exercise to reintegrate the insurgents and die-hards into social mainstream. These four methods function at ideological, security, political and societal levels and are founded on the ideas of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization. Detail is given below in the table:

De-radicalization Approaches

Approach	Focus	Strategy	Objective
Security	Detainees	Rehabilitation	Reducing security threats
Societal	Vulnerable communities	Engagement	Developing moderate tendencies
Ideological	Clergy	Highlighting religion's emphasis on peace	Developing counter arguments/ narratives
Political	Society at large	Winning hearts and minds	Neutralizing security threats

Source: (Rana, 2011, p. 1).

There is a common settlement that the best opposition to radicalization lies in an amalgamation of all the four methods. Different countries use different policies alternating from commitment to engaging the minds and hearts of the individuals. But the purpose of many of the

platforms is nullifying the security fears. Although sharing mutual goals, such platforms in Muslim countries have some features that differ from the approaches established by non-Muslim countries with considerable Muslim residents. Strategies by Muslim countries focus mostly on deterrence and producing a conceptual reaction to radicalization. The Indonesian, Jordanian, Egyptian and Yemeni models basically settled as moral answers and the Saudi model highlighted on reintegration through social and psychological components, along with philosophical reactions. Detail is given below in the table:

De-radicalization Models in Muslim Countries

Model	Strategy	Constraints for Pakistan
Saudi Arabian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevention • Cure/rehabilitation • Care/support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political • Ideological • Economic cost
Indonesian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highlighting the conflict as the country's own war • Role of former militants in rehabilitation • Effective policing • Efficient and effective prosecution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Militant landscape is more complex • Failure to gain support of former militants for the process
Jordanian	Counter-narratives/ ideological responses dictated by the state	A forcible or aggressive approach would not work in Pakistan
Yemeni	Dialogue through a committee consisting of respected religious scholars	Lack of consensus among the clergy
Egyptian	Revision/ correction of concepts (<i>Tashih Al-Mafahim</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sectarian divide • Inflexible religious discourse
Algerian	Reconciliation and Transformation	Lack of political Consensus

Source: (Rana, 2011, p. 2)

Though many Muslim countries have copied modules of their de-radicalization plans from the Saudi approaches, however they have failed to arrange their policies according to local desires because of deficiency of funds and human resources. As an assessment summary: “Saudi Arabia has access to a significant amount of entire income and is able to dedicate a large amount of money to the success of the program. In addition, Saudi clerics hold an authority enhanced by Saudi Arabia’s claim to guardianship of the two holy cities in Islam. Saudi Arabia’s vast resources, both monetary and religious, allow for program components that are difficult to replicate in other locations” (Rana, 2011, p. 3).

To restrain these limitations, the Yemeni militant rehabilitation method holds a group of religious researchers directed by Judge Hamoud Al-Hitar for discussion with Al Qaeda convicts. Indonesia works a diverse way and involves hindering extremists to generate an active comeback to radicalization. The activities have produced mixed outcomes which have been recognized to queries of reliability of extremists in Indonesia and of the Group for Religious conversation directed by Al-Hitar in Yemen, in which prisoners often consider share of the government machine (Rana, 2011, p. 3).

But Egypt’s long debate among detained activists, which confronted the extremism description in that state, has showed operative, generally because it was creativity by associates of radical cluster Gamaa Islamiya themselves and the government stimulated the argument only at an advanced phase. The discussion was started among many of restrained supporters of Gamaa Islamiya and examined the explanation for aggressiveness in order to attain their specified goals. Then through dialogue, understanding and secretive discussions, the convicts approached the decision that they had been operated into following an extremist track. Starting the discussion was clearly tough as it tackled resilient early resistance both inside and outside the jails; though ultimately trapped followers of Al-Jihad, the supreme violent cluster in Egypt which was commanded by Ayman al-Zawahiri, also initiated to direct attention in connecting the non-violent creativity. However, it was Dr. Fadl, one of the planners of Al Qaeda’s philosophical model, who revolved the advantage into the great debate (Rana, 2011, p. 3).

None of these creativities have been accepted in Pakistan and the approach being tarnished in Malakand and Swat pulls its outlines from

Saudi Arabia. However, the problems challenging Pakistan are difficult. Charter for peace and national reconciliation of Algeria suggests a method that can deliver the basic outlines for a counter radicalization policy in Pakistan. Policies for reintegration of hostages form an essential portion of a broad strategy on de-radicalization. Pakistan can learn from de-radicalization approaches of non-Muslim countries which arrange security fears, as defence is a main component in their approaches. But defence can be guaranteed only by examining the fears the extremists position both at the ideological and security points. The Australian de-radicalization approach contains scrutiny as a main module in its policies (Rana, 2011, p. 3). Detail is given below in the table:

De-Radicalization Models in Non-Muslim Countries

State	Strategy	Constraints for Pakistan
Singapore	Religious rehabilitation groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political • Such efforts may be perceived as attempts to promote secularism by force
Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis • Protection • Response • Resilience 	Economic cost
United Kingdom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pursue • Prepare • Protect • Prevent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dissimilar patterns of radicalization

Source: (Rana, 2011, p. 3)

Terrorists are different from regular criminals in many conducts in that they are strong-minded by an ideology, some professed or actual grievance, and religious explanations that suit their cause. Saudi Arabia has established a rehabilitation plan ever since 2004 it has reintegrated and rehabilitated more than 4000 militants into typical society. Saudi Arabia has the best recognized de-radicalization process and the best commonly acknowledged “soft tactics to counter terrorism” in the Middle East (Boucek, 2008, pp. 1-4).

Creativities and visions to restrain the radicalism as an approach are “part of Saudi Arabia’s long-term counterterrorism strategy”. The war of thoughts is battled “to instil the concepts of moderation and tolerance, and to undermine any justification for extremism and terrorism on an intellectual level”. These early estimates maintaining the aims of Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalization policy of quick interrogations about the explanation of expressions such as ‘extremism’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘moderation’. Once mutual definitions are recognized, Saudi Arabia’s “Counter-Radicalization” and “Rehabilitation Program” can be put in comparison to other such platforms to increase discussion and best-exercises contributing among global players. While the terms of de-radicalization, rehabilitation, reintegration and disengagement are used commonly by administrations and analysts (Boucek, 2008, pp. 1-4).

The two prominent writers Horgan and Fink identified that de-radicalization and counter-radicalization indicate rational features and test fundamentalist thoughts and their clarifications, while disengagement follows to change behaviour. Horgan “emphasizes the need for clarity in distinguishing deradicalization (attitudinal modification) from disengagement (behavioral modification).” Cragin and Davis also distinguish between a “change in actions” and a “change in beliefs”. Horgan observes that “[o]ften there can be physical disengagement from terrorist activity, but no concomitant change or reduction in ideological support, or indeed, the social and psychological control that the particular ideology exerts on the individual” (Horgan 2008, p. 5).

De-Radicalization Efforts

The army uses some confinement centres, such as Sabawoon and Mishal in Swat, to de-radicalise extremists through psychological patterns and supervision by sociologists and moderate clerics. Professional training is delivered to support rehabilitated prisoners obtain occupations. The Taliban partners who are not diehard fighters but were considered helpers, falling in the third level are integrated in the schools. The rehabilitation programs have been allocated into four main sections, containing an educational section covering formal education, exclusively for youngsters, to empower them to endure their education. Another section comprises psychological therapy and counselling for increasing logical and independent discerning. The social section includes social

matters and family contribution and the fourth section includes vocational teaching (Rana, 2011, p. 4).

An advanced counterterrorism approach known as 'de-radicalization' and 'rehabilitation' that has a lenient side is being used round the globe as many states have developed jihadist rehabilitation programs including Egypt, Algeria, Singapore, Jordan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. In Pakistan, some rehabilitation schools launched for the prisoners other than the hard-core extremists adopt this strategy. These centres consider that violent and Islamic extremism cannot be crushed by traditional security resources alone as violent philosophy is based on divergent clarifications of Islam.

De-radicalization, rehabilitation, disengagement and reintegration of the militants can prove very helpful for Pakistan in the long run. The procedure of de-radicalization includes a pre-radicalization phase of an individual's world, his lifestyle, social status, neighborhood, religion and education just earlier to the start of their expedition down the track of radicalization. We consider help from the stages through which an individual passes to become a radical item. It defines that the individual seen to exhibit radical approach comes to the level of violent radicalization. Violent radicalization includes the stages of becoming tangled with a terrorist organization, continuing involvement and interest in terrorist activity. To de-radicalize the captive, he has to suffer a disengagement procedure and then finally the purpose of de-radicalization is attained that aims for practical alterations in individuals' thought and attitudes, and focuses on helping behavioural change (Horgan, 2009, p. 4).

Sabawoon's eighteen month program has four modules: counselling and therapy; vocational training; formal education, containing corrective Islamic education; and a social component to deliberate social problems and hold conferences with the recipients' families. Sabawoon Center follows the education scheme and syllabuses of the Provincial Education Commission, and also offers classes at the intermediate level. The syllabus is generous in nature and tries to teach the learners Islam, harmony and tolerance (Qazi, 2013, p. 8). Since 2009, Sabawoon has refined around 200 previous child warriors and transformed 143 child soldiers into the society. Reintegration criteria comprise expert psychosocial assessment, vocational skills, educational performance and

family's level of commitment with the youngster. "Low-risk" boys are transformed rapidly if they and their relatives do not have terrorist links and there is no terrorist existence in their society. Different squads visit communities or villages to examine this. Additionally, Sabawoon confirms that their inheritors either move into a high school or are engaged in work at the phase of rehabilitation (Qazi, 2013, p. 9).

Presently, Pakistan multitudes six recognized de-radicalization programs: Mishal, Sparley, Pythom, Rastoon and Heila for deradicalization and the Sabawoon Center for Rehabilitation. Sabawoon Center is the only civilian-run project. Two plans that are involved with seminaries (madaris) to encourage peace initiatives and tolerance are the training workshops for Deeni teachers and Khateebis and Madrasah Enhancement Project (MEP). Through the Mishal Rehabilitation Centre, over 400 persons have been reintegrated into the community so far. Project Mishal purports at "providing an environment conducive for restoring self-respect for selected individuals to de-radicalize and remove their psychological burden caused by ideological exploitation and/or coercion so as to make them and their families useful citizens of the society" (Rana, 2011, p. 4).

The rehabilitation programs have been distributed into four main sections: social section includes social matters and family contribution; educational section containing formal education especially for youngsters allows them to sustain their education. Another section includes psychological counselling and treatment for developing logical and independent thinking and the fourth section includes professional and vocational teaching, such as repairing home appliances, masonry and computers etc., to prepare the prisoners with abilities that empower them to maintain honorable subsistence (Rana, 2011, p. 4).

The reintegration of this rank is significant but the program requires to be prolonged to the mid-level cadre because the insurgents have more ideological and political tendencies for radicalization. If some teenagers are disconnected from extremism, they can show valuable effects in the de-radicalization procedure, as has occurred in Indonesia. But disconnection of mid-level cadre is a tough job and answering their descriptions is a task where Egypt has a decent record (Rana, 2011, p. 5).

Re-engagement/ Recidivism

There is a chance of the militants' reversion into the actions of extremism after rehabilitation. The burning question therefore remains whether these programs are effective, as there is a chance that the militants being rehabilitated and reintegrated into the society can re-engage in terrorism. The criteria for determining success remain a reluctant and indefinable feature of most of these platforms. National Offender Management Service (NOMS) is a procedure engaged by British psychologists who have freshly established a peer-reviewed methodology for measuring risk of recidivism among extremist offenders and a set of directed involvements (Horgan & Altier, 2012, p. 87). The threat of recidivism is a main trial for de-radicalization programs. To counter this risk, an observing system has been formed. Army officers check in with transformed juveniles every month to judge their actions. This observing procedure continues for at least two years.

Conclusion

In the end, however, it is Pakistan's strategic decision to fully engage in a counterinsurgency campaign against militant groups in KPK and FATA. Therefore, this aid should seek to complement a Pakistani decision to improve its counterinsurgency capabilities. First and foremost, in order to make the necessary institutional changes, Pakistan might consider assessing the relative importance of counterinsurgency versus conventional military operations, highlighting the latter, and officially recognizing this paradigm shift by adopting a formal doctrine.

Pakistan is going through the worst situation of its history because it is confined in the war with its own people. The counter-terrorism strategies have not helped Pakistan. Rather, they have deteriorated extremism. The de-radicalization centres established for the rehabilitation of juveniles have indicated to be very useful in Pakistan. There lie some gaps in the programs, but through prearranged attention and planning, they can be made advanced and can contest with the radicalization very efficiently. Some countries have invested a lot in Pakistan in many development schemes; there is a requirement to provide a devotion to this region also because the pilot projects initiated by the government and army on low level have showed to be very helpful. This will contribute a long-term advantage to Pakistan in

allocating with its most dominant and unwanted component in the society and will also help international community.

De-radicalization and disengagement programs have likely endured a basic part of larger counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization policies. However, governments cannot afford to be careless or immature in rehabilitation of extremists. To prosper, de-radicalization strategies must be wide struggles that include emotional, ideological and practical sections and significant support. Prison-based de-radicalization projects, in particular, need to work out attention, cautiously judging each individual before release and executing protections.

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